In his Essais, Montaigne describes himself by a language which will not yield to a discrimination of tenses. “I have not made my book more than my book has made me,” he insists. As Frederick Rider writes, there is a “disparity between his exaggerated modesty and his pretended frankness”1 deriving from his disciplined emulation of the sprezzatura style, a casual “aristocratic nonchalance” evident in greater and greater density the more he rewrote his essays. Montaigne was forty-seven when he completed the first of four editions in 1580. As he revised them he relaxed the seriousness of his first effort, claiming for his soul a greater flamboyance, honing with religious unpredictability a whimsical phraseology of bodily attributes, an anarchistic climate of virility and pun-emission his life was lacking. Here was the essence of his countering method, a vogue calculated to reveal personal particulars inadvertently via a fanfare of gestures, witty braggadocio, and effigiation by which was riotously extolled the first public obsession with oneself as a preeminent means of understanding the world. “I study myself. That is my metaphysics, that is my physics.”
He commences his lengthy piece “Of Vanity” with a mention that he can only succeed in keeping a record of his life by depicting his thoughts, which he terms “excrements of an old mind sometimes hard, sometimes loose, and always undigested.”2 He emphasizes his pitiable servitude to his estate and financial concerns before launching into a lingua ejecta upon the matters of law, speech, travel, laziness, housekeeping, conjugal love, friendship, enjoyment, old age, confession, death, solitude, fortune, and, lastly, vanity. Most of his essays sport such disquisitorial randomness. James Olney writes, “To found, in the Montaignesque way, all philosophy in autobiography; to plunge into subjectivity as wholly and intensely as Montaigne does; to refuse any other subject than the self as completely as he does—this symbolizes the historical tendency of philosophic concerns since the Reformation.”3 In it is the genesis of humanism—that autistic excuse by which the mediaeval church traumatized Europe’s populace; the anguished apotheosis of Marx’s proletariat Everyman; the hedonistic melancholy of modernist art and philosophy; and our contemporary inferno of laissez-faire selfishness, media confession, and expedient angst—Tom Wolfe’s “me” generation. By the criteria of a long-standing critical sentiment, however, a literary primer which has sought out its assessments of writers according to their mobility in public, Montaigne aggravates a discrepancy, a prejudice which has been aimed against any and all conversions of a writer’s subject into aspects of himself.4 He is lodged, as it were, between the garrulous chaos of “gestalt autobiography” and the silence of Zen satori.
