The selection of Einstein as a subject for a volume in the Library of Living Philosophers1 was a happy idea, even if the grounds for the selection are not obvious. Einstein’s eminence as a physicist is a byword and is indisputable, he has thought deeply on the logic of natural science, and he has given repeated proof of a sensitive social conscience and a broad humanity. But he is not a systematic philosophic thinker, and the range of his specific philosophic concerns is not comprehensive. His explicit philosophic writings fall almost exclusively into that vaguely bounded area known as the philosophy of physics and the theory of knowledge. But even on fundamental issues in this domain he has published only sparingly; and though he has often embodied his views in pregnant and penetrating aphorisms, he has developed them less explicitly and clearly than the complexity of the questions requires. Accordingly, the exposition of the philosophic import of his revolutionary contributions to physics has in the main been the work of professional philosophers. Again, Einstein has expressed himself with vigor and courage on many problems of social policy and social morality. But by no stretch of courtesy can he be classified as either a profound or a systematic social thinker, and his views on public questions are of interest chiefly because they are the convictions of a great physicist and a noble human being. Certainly, he has published nothing of intrinsic importance either on the structure of social values or processes, or on the methodological issues of the social sciences. If therefore the selection of Einstein for discussion in this series of volumes dedicated to philosophers is warranted, it is warranted on other grounds than his explicit contributions to systematic philosophic analysis.
Nonetheless, there can be no serious question as to the appropriateness and significance of the selection. The selection is warranted, because his scientific achievements are in considerable measure the outcome of several centuries of philosophic criticism of the foundations of physics, because his reconstruction of physics exhibits in a singularly arresting and illuminating manner the logic of scientific inquiry, and because his work embodies analyses that are a fundamental challenge to a variety of philosophic preconceptions and dogmas. His inclusion for extended philosophic treatment involves, moreover, at least a tacit recognition of the fact that philosophy cannot be pursued, on pain of becoming sterile and otiose, as a discipline independent of specialized scientific inquiry. The appearance of this volume supplies additional proof that reflection on the subject-matters and procedures of the special sciences is at least as relevant for achieving a competent generalized view of man and nature, as are the ideas of thinkers whose only subject-matter is the history of philosophy and the writings of other professional philosophers.
