Materialism has as at no time been common among professional philosophers, since Plato and Aristotle became authoritative. Before that time, it was dominant: the Epicureans and early Stoics were materialists, and so were many, if not most, of the pre-Socratics. But in modern times materialism has been almost wholly confined to men of science as opposed to philosophers, and to a minority among them. Idealists and empiricists, among philosophers, have alike opposed it: idealists on the ground that there can be no reality apart from consciousness, empiricists on the ground that “substance” is a useless concept. (I hold the idealist argument invalid, but the empiricist argument valid.) Locke proved “substance” useless, but rejected his own proof; Berkeley accepted it as regards matter but not mind, Hume pressed home the argument as regards both matter and mind. Since his time, it has not been reasonable to regard either “matter” or “mind” as names of any part of the “stuff” of the world. Some men of science, however, continued to believe in atoms as solidly real. Many writers give the impression that in the sixties of last century almost all the physicists were materialists, but this is of course a wild exaggeration. I doubt if the proportion ever rose as high as ten per cent. The majority, like Faraday and Maxwell, were earnest Christians.
The philosophic argument against matter might have remained inoperative, if it had not been reinforced by physics. Einstein showed the need of substituting four-dimensional space-time for three-dimensional space and one-dimensional time. This meant, mathematically, substituting a manifold of point-instants for the two manifolds of points and instants; practically, it meant substituting “events” for moving particles. Quantum physics, by different arguments, also shows the need for this substitution.
