In the late 1920s there was a good deal of discussion of whether it was necessary to share the beliefs of a poet—his religious beliefs or his intellectually formulated attitudes toward the world at large—in order to get from his poetry all that it was capable of giving. It didn’t really get very far. In Practical Criticism I A Richards declared that good readers “are very little disturbed by even a direct opposition between their own beliefs and the beliefs of the poet,” because they are capable of distinguishing between “intellectual belief” and “emotional belief,” the latter being a belief that is entertained not in the context of verifiable fact or intellectual coherence but solely with reference to its furtherance of coherence in the reader’s emotions and attitudes. This, which is related to the notion of “‘pseudo-statements” Richards developed in Science and Poetry, did not give much purchase for further inquiry. T S Eliot’s lengthy “Note” on the matter in his Dante was honest but self-contradictory. “I deny [he said] that the reader must share the belief of the poet to enjoy the poetry fully.” But after saying that this view, like its opposite, raised difficulties, he went on to admit that Dante’s la sua volontade è nostra pace, which for the poet was literally true, “has more beauty for me now, when my own experience has deepened its meaning, than it did when I first read it. So I can only conclude that I cannot, in practice, wholly separate my poetic appreciation from my personal beliefs.” This leaves the meaning of “enjoy,” in the first sentence quoted, extremely vague.
The issues raised here were partly obscured by the development of the New Criticism, with its tendency to see each poem as an autonomous object, all extraneous information (biographical or historical) being irrelevant. That position was plainly untenable, if only because words have a history, some of which they bring into any poem in which they occur. For a long time, however, “belief,” and its part in the poet/reader relationship, received far less attention than the verbal intricacies of particular poems. But the problem was merely dormant, and in 1957 the English Institute devoted a conference to it, with some distinguished participants. One of them, M H Abrams, made some remarks that illustrate the difficulty of coming to grips with it. Insisting that we are all capable of enjoying Dante simply on the grounds of our common humanity, he admitted that this would not satisfy Dante, a didactic poet who engages us in his poem, “not as an end in itself, but as a means towards retroacting upon and reforming our beliefs and sentiments. If we circumvent him by stopping at the appreciation of what he shows forth, he would no doubt consider his great undertaking a failure. But for most of us the enjoyment of his didactic poem as, simply, a poem, must perforce be enough.”
