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Autumn 1940 • Vol. II No. 4 • Nonfiction |

George Santayana: The Philosopher as Poet



Mr. Santayana began his poetic career with three handicaps which he did not entirely overcome: he was a philosopher, he was addicted to Platonism, and he lived in the United States at the end of the 19th Century. These handicaps were greater, I suspect, than the one on which he himself lays most emphasis, that English was not his mother-tongue, that he “never drank in in childhood the homely cadences and ditties which in pure spontaneous poetry set the essential key,” that he knew “no words redolent of the wonder-world, the fairy-tale, or the cradle.” This circumstance would bar to him a certain kind of lyricism, but I cannot believe that such a master of English prose as Santayana has suffered severely from the linguistic difficulty. The chief defects that show in his poetry are defects of perception and imagination.

A profound acquaintance with philosophy is not necessarily detrimental to a poet; in fact Santayana argues persuasively that the greatest poetry is philosophical. Yet each pursuit has its exacting craft; and though the whole mind is enlisted in both cases, the emphasis, the method and the daily discipline are radically different. If the philosopher is addicted to Platonism, even with Santayana’s reservations, the handicap is more serious. In The World’s Body John Crowe Ransom has argued, with plausibility, that it was a kind of Platonism, conscious or unconscious, that set English poetry on a wrong track, late in the 17th Century, from which it has not altogether returned to the main highway. If this view is correct, then Santayana’s Platonism was simply a part of his third handicap, his time and place. In suggesting that to write poetry in English at the end of the 19th Century was the gravest handicap of all, I am assuming the fundamental soundness of the revolution in the conception of poetry that has occurred in the last twenty or twenty-five years. Like most revolutions, this one has consisted partly in a return to an earlier state of affairs, real or imagined, and consequently in the repudiation of a vested heresy. Recent critics have written voluminously on the subject, but I shall summarize the latest and one of the most brilliant (although not perhaps the most judicious) treatments of it, Cleanth Brooks’s in his book Modern Poetry and the Tradition. The heresy in question, as Brooks argues with documentation, was shared in greater or less degree by all the leading arbiters of poetic taste since and including Dryden: by Addison, Pope, Dr. Johnson, Wordsworth, Coleridge, Arnold, and latterly A. E. Housman. Its central assumption is that metaphor or imagery in a poem is primarily an illustration or an ornament. That is to say, that metaphor is not an integral structural part of the poem. The core of the poem, according to this view, consists in its “subject,” which may be a Platonic idea, a moral direction, or an emotion. But in any of these cases the imagery is merely instrumental: it explains the idea, or renders the moral teaching palatable and persuasive, or sets the emotion vibrating.

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